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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MONROE COUNTY SHERIFF 
POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-22122 
COUNTY OF MONROE AND 
MONROE COUNTY SHERIFF, 
Respondent. 
GOLDBERG SEGALLA, LLP (PATRICK B. NAYLON of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
BARRY C. WATKINS, ESQ., for Respondent County of Monroe 
CHARLES PILATO, ESQ., for Respondent Monroe County Sheriff 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the County of Monroe (County) and 
cross-exceptions filed by the Monroe County Sheriff Police Benevolent Association, Inc. 
(PBA) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), finding that the County 
violated §209-a.1(c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
ceased granting the PBA president a second day per week of union release time in 
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retaliation for the exercise of protected rights.1 
EXCEPTIONS 
The County asserts in its exceptions that the ALJ erred in concluding that its 
reasons for denying the release time were pretextual and were improperly motivated 
and that the proof relied upon by the ALJ in finding a violation of §209-a.1 (c) was 
circumstantialT-The-Gounty-also-argues-that-the-AbJ-erred-bynot-aeeepting-evidenee of 
the contract negotiations that followed its denial of union release time and in the 
remedial relief ordered. The PBA supports the ALJ's decision, but argues that the ALJ 
erred in denying its motion to amend its improper practice charge to allege a violation of 
§209-a.1(d)oftheAct. 
Based upon our review of the record, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
The facts are set forth in detail in the ALJ's decision2 and are repeated here only 
as necessary to our decision. 
1
 The charge originally alleged that §§209-a.1(c) and (e) of the Act had been violated. 
The (e) allegation was withdrawn after the first day of hearing. The PBA at that time 
sought to amend the charge to include an allegation that §209-a.1(d) of the Act had 
been violated, seeking to conform its pleadings to the proof. Reading the PBA's offer of 
proof as alleging that there was newly discovered evidence upon which the proposed 
amendment was at least partially based, the ALJ scheduled a second day of hearing 
and accepted evidence on the alleged (d) violation, while reserving decision on whether 
to accept the amendment to the charge. Following the second day of hearing, the ALJ 
denied the proposed amendment to the charge. Her ruling was confirmed in her 
decision. 
2
 35 PERB 114586 (2002). 
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Daniel Finnerty is the president of the PBA and has been since its inception.3 He 
is employed as a road patrol deputy in the Sheriff's Department. Upon commencing his 
term as PBA president, Finnerty was advised by then Chief Deputy Douglas Nordquist 
and then Undersheriff Patrick O'Flynn, now undersheriff and Sheriff, respectively, that 
he would receive one day per week of release time for union business. Finnerty agreed 
but filed-a eontraet grievanee^nonetheless^to-proteGt-his-rights.-ThereafteMn 
settlement of the grievance and a related improper practice charge, Finnerty, the then 
sheriff and Barry Watkins, Monroe County Labor Relations Manager, agreed that until 
June 1, 1999, Finnerty would work a 5-2 schedule (Monday through Friday, with 
Saturday and Sunday off) with Monday and Friday as his union release days. 
Shortly before June 1, 1999, Finnerty met with Nordquist to discuss union 
release time. It was agreed that Finnerty would commence working a 4-2 schedule (four 
days on, two days off) with Friday as his union release day, unless his day off was a 
Friday and then Monday would be his union release day. With respect to the second 
release day, it was agreed that he would receive a second day per week if he submitted 
requests to Nordquist, as a package, one month in advance. The agreement was not 
reduced to writing, although Nordquist did write a memorandum to his PBA file, noting 
that: "Sgt. Finnerty is not (emphasis in original) requesting that we renew the 
J
 In 1998, the PBA was recognized as the representative of the deputies in the road 
patrol bureau of the office of the Sheriff of the County of Monroe (Sheriff). The road 
patrol deputies had formerly been in a unit of all Sheriffs Department employees, 
represented by the Monroe County Deputy Sheriff's Association (DSA), which now 
represents only the employees in the jail, civil and court security bureaus of the Sheriff's 
Department. 
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agreement which allowed for two release days per week. For the time being, he will 
submit request forms for additional time needed to conduct union business." 
Finnerty submitted requests for the second release day from June 1,1999 
through October 2000. Not one of the requests was ever denied by Nordquist. Contract 
negotiations between the County and the PBA commenced in October 1999. Fact-
finding-tookplace in^June 2000-and-the-faet-finder-s-report-and-reeommendation-was 
issued on October 9, 2000. Nordquist and Finnerty spoke shortly thereafter and 
Finnerty told Nordquist that the PBA membership was going to be advised by the 
executive board to reject the fact finder's report. 
In August 2000, the PBA voted "no confidence" in the then Sheriff and then 
Undersheriff O'Flynn. The PBA also sent a letter to Governor Pataki at that time. In 
early September 2000, Finnerty sent forms for release time in October 2000 to 
Nordquist and they were approved. In early October 2000, Finnerty submitted the union 
release request forms for November 2000. Nordquist did not respond to the requests. 
Finnerty and Nordquist spoke just prior to a negotiating session on October 24, 
2000. When questioned by Finnerty, Nordquist confirmed that Finnerty would no longer 
be receiving two days of union release time per week, although he did not say why. 
Finnerty ceased requesting the second union release day per week after that and filed 
the instant charge.4 
At the negotiating session, Finnerty formally informed the County and Sheriff that 
the PBA executive board was advising the PBA members to reject the fact finder's 
4
 Finnerty continued to receive some additional days, as requested, for attendance at 
grievance hearings and improper practice proceedings. He had always received those 
days, as requested, in addition to the weekly second day of union release time. 
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report and recommendations. The parties continued to meet thereafter and reached a 
financial settlement in late December 2000. However, contract language had still not 
been finalized as of the first day of hearing in the instant case. 
Nordquist testified that the agreement regarding the grant of the second union 
release day after June 1, 1999, was for the purpose of giving Finnerty union release 
timeduring-the-eontraet-negotiations-between-the PBA-and-the-GountyT-and-that-this 
condition for the second day of union release time was communicated to Finnerty. 
However, Finnerty denied that this was a condition placed on his receipt of a second 
union release day, and this condition does not appear in Nordquist's memorandum to 
the PBA file, memorializing the agreement with Finnerty. The record also reflects that 
during the time between the fact-finding hearing and the issuance of the fact finder's 
report and recommendation, the parties were not meeting to negotiate, yet all of 
Finnerty's requests for the second day of union release time were granted by Nordquist. 
At the close of Finnerty's direct testimony, and again at the close of the PBA's 
case (which consisted solely of Finnerty's testimony), the County moved to dismiss the 
improper practice charge for failure to prove a prima facie case. The ALJ reserved 
decision on the motion and the County put in its case. In her decision, the ALJ denied 
the motion.5 
After the close of the first day of hearing on the instant improper practice charge, 
the PBA made an application to amend the charge to withdraw the §209-a.1(e) 
allegation and to add an alleged violation of §209-a.1(d) of the Act. The basis of the 
motion is that an established past practice existed whereby the PBA president received 
5
 No exceptions were taken to the ALJ's denial of the motion to dismiss. 
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two days per week for conducting union business. The PBA offered a 1990 arbitration 
award interpreting the County-DSA contract and finding that the contract and past 
practice entitled the DSA president to a 5-2 schedule, with Monday and Friday for union 
release time. The PBA asserted that the motion to amend merely conforms the 
pleadings to the proof adduced at the first day of hearing. The ALJ denied the motion to 
amend-as-not-being-eonsistentwith-due-proeessT 
DISCUSSION 
Initially, we find that the ALJ properly denied the PBA's motion to amend the 
improper practice charge to include an allegation that the County violated §209-a.1(d) 
of the Act by unilaterally discontinuing the past practice of granting the PBA president 
two days of union release time per week. A motion to conform the pleadings to the 
proof is essentially a request to amend the charge. Leave to amend is not available if 
the effect is to add a new substantive claim otherwise barred by PERB's four-month 
statute of limitations.6 Here, as found by the ALJ, the PBA was aware at the time it filed 
the improper practice charge of the practice it alleged had been changed by the 
County's refusal to grant a second day of union release time. The arbitration award 
referred to in its motion does not establish a past practice upon which the PBA can rely 
and, thus, cannot be considered to be newly-discovered evidence that would allow the 
filing of the amendment after the first day of hearing.7 The practice that was changed by 
the County's refusal to grant additional release time in October 2000, was the practice 
agreed to by Finnerty and Nordquist prior to the expiration of the temporary agreement 
6
 Rules of Procedure, §204.1 (a)(1). See also Town ofBrookhaven, 26 PERB 1J3066 
(1993). 
7
 See County of Westchester (Dep't of Correction), 31 PERB P022 (1998). 
Board - U-22122 -7 
on June 1, 1999. To grant the PBA's motion would not merely have formalized an issue 
already before the parties, it would have injected a new issue into the proceeding at a 
late date.8 
As to the alleged violation of §209-a.1 (c) of the Act, we find, as did the ALJ, that 
the County denied Finnerty's request for a second day per week of union release time 
because o f his exercise o f protected-rights-lnGot/^ 
While timing alone is insufficient to support a finding of a 
violation of §§209-a.1(a) and (c), a close proximity in time 
between a protected activity and an adverse action may be 
sufficient to raise a suspicion of a causal relationship. Proof 
of such a causal relationship may be found in circumstantial 
evidence, (footnotes omitted) 
Here, there is no dispute that Finnerty was engaged in protected activity when 
the PBA voted "no confidence" in the operation of the Sheriff's Department and when 
he and the PBA executive board recommended to the PBA membership that the fact 
finder's report and recommendations be rejected. It is also clear that Nordquist was 
aware of the PBA's actions shortly after the issuance of the report and recommendation 
in early October 2000. 
The denial of Finnerty's request for a second day of union release time at the 
October 24, 2000 meeting, without explanation, after such requests were routinely and 
promptly granted on a monthly basis for more than a year, was sufficient circumstantial 
evidence to support a prima facie violation of §209-a.1 (c) of the Act, thereby shifting the 
8
 See Town of Brookhaven, 25 PERB P077 (1992). See also State of New York (Dep't 
of Trans.), 23 PERB 1J3005 (1990), confd, 174 AD2d 905, 24 PERB 1J7014 (3d Dep't 
1991). 
9
 34 PERBH3042, at 3102 (2001). 
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burden to the County to rebut same with evidence of a legitimate business reason for 
its actions. 
We find, as did the ALJ, that the reasons proffered by the County are pretextual. 
The ALJ credited Finnerty's testimony that the grant of the second day of union release 
time had never been tied to contract negotiations. There is nothing in the record that 
would-warrant-disturbing the-AUJ-s-eredibility-resolution-Furtherrwe-find-that-the-fail-u-re 
of Nordquist to note the alleged condition for the grant of release time in his own 
memorandum to his files memorializing the agreement with Finnerty belies his assertion 
that the grant of time was contingent on the ongoing contract negotiations. This 
conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that Finnerty's requests for the second day 
of union release time were granted during the summer while the parties were waiting for 
the issuance of the fact finder's report and recommendation and were not actively 
engaged in contract negotiations.10 It was only after Nordquist became aware of the 
PBA's "no confidence" vote in the Sheriff's Department and its plan to reject the fact 
finder's report and recommendation that Finnerty's requests were denied. 
Lastly, we reach the exceptions filed by the County asserting that the ALJ erred 
in not allowing the County to introduce evidence about bargaining proposals regarding 
union release time introduced in contract negotiations after the events covered by the 
instant charge. The County argues that its willingness to negotiate union release time in 
contract negotiations after its denial of Finnerty's requests for the second day of union 
lu
 The ALJ's point that the duty to bargain continues through fact-finding and 
subsequent efforts at conciliation and the resumption of negotiations is well-taken. See 
City of Newburgh, 15 PERB fl3116 (1982), confirmed sub nom. City of Newburgh v 
PERB, 97 AD2d 258, 16 PERB 1J7030 (3d Dep't 1983), aff'd 63 NY2d 793, 17 PERB 
117017(1984). 
Board - U-22122 -9 
release time negates the finding of retaliation. The ALJ correctly found such evidence to 
be irrelevant in a case alleging a §209-a.1(c) violation. Post-conduct actions may be 
relevant if they show a continued course of conduct that may relate back to the conduct 
in question. But an alleged willingness to negotiate the subject matter of an action 
which is alleged to be discriminatory, especially in the absence of a rescission or 
co rrectionoHhe-action complained ofris-not-relevantHn-determining-whether-a-vioIation 
occurred.11 We find, therefore, that the County violated §209-a.1(c) of the Act when it 
refused Finnerty's requests for a second day per week of union release time in 
retaliation for his participation in the "no confidence" vote and his recommendation, as 
part of the PBA executive board, that the PBA members reject the fact finder's report 
and recommendation. 
Based on the foregoing, we deny the exceptions of the County and the cross-
exceptions filed by the PBA, and affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the County: 
1. Forthwith restore the practice by which Sgt. Daniel Finnerty submitted, 
one month in advance, requests for, and received, a second day of 
union release time per week; 
2. Make Finnerty whole for his use of any accrued leave credits in order to 
conduct union business from October 24, 2000, until the restoration of 
the practice as it existed prior to October 24, 2000; 
11
 See Town of Huntington, 27 PERB 1T3039 (1994). 
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3. Cease and desist from discriminating against Finnerty in retaliation for 
the exercise of the protected right to recommend rejection of a fact 
finder's report and recommendation or to participate in a "no 
confidence" vote in the operation of the Sheriff's Department; and 
4. Sign and post the attached notice to employees at all locations 
customarily used by the County to communicate with employees in the 
unit represented by the PBA.12 
DATED: January 23, 2003 
New York, New York —--^] j -/ //y / ' ^ 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
^0 
ohn T. Mitchell, Member 
12
 The County argues the relief ordered is in excess of PERB's authority. The remedial 
relief ordered is consistent with PERB's remedial relief powers and is consistent with 
the instruction of the Court of Appeals in State Division of Human Rights v. County of 
Onondaga, 71 NY2d 623 (1988), which held that remedial relief should not give more to 
a victim of discrimination than that which he or she would have achieved but for the 
discrimination, while directing that relief should not fall short of placing an individual in 
the same position in which he or she would have been had the discrimination not taken 
place. See also City of Dunkirk, 23 PERB P025 (1990). 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
^NEW YORK STATE—^ — 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES" FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees represented by the Monroe County Sheriff Police Benevolent 
Association, Inc. that the County of Monroe and Monroe County Sheriff wi l l : 
1. Forthwith restore the practice by which Sgt. Daniel Finnerty submitted, one month in 
advance, requests for, and received, a second day of union release time per week. 
2. Make Finnerty whole for his use of any accrued leave credits in order to conduct union 
business from October 24, 2000, until the restoration of the practice as it existed prior to 
October 24, 2000. 
3. Not discriminate against Finnerty in retaliation for the exercise of the protected right to 
recommend rejection of a fact finder's report and recommendation or to participate in a "no 
confidence" vote in the operation of the Sheriff's Department. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
COUNTY OF MONROE and MONROE COUNTY SHERIFF 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must 
ot be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
RONALD PAGANINI, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-23182 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Respondent, 
- and -
CITY OF LONG BEACH, 
Employer. 
RONALD PAGANINI, pro se 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (STEVEN A. GRAIN of 
counsel), for Respondent 
WILLIAM G. HOLST, CORPORATION COUNSEL (COREY E. KLEIN 
of counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Ronald Paganini to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on an improper practice charge alleging that the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) violated 
§209-3 2(c) Of the Public Emolovees ' Fair Ernnlnvment Ant fAr.t\ hv faii inri tr> filp> a 
grievance against the City of Long Beach (City) because the City had denied his 
request for personal days. CSEA, in its answer, denied the material allegations of the 
Board-U-23182 - 2 
charge and alleged in its defense that it investigated the grievance in good faith. The 
City, in its answer, also denied the material allegations of the charge and raised several 
affirmative defenses. 
EXCEPTIONS 
Paganini argues in his exceptions, inter alia, that the ALJ erred on the law and 
the facts based upon.newly-discovered evidence annexed to the exceptions but not 
made a part of the original record before the ALJ. 
CSEA and the City both object to the introduction of evidence outside the record 
and urge that the ALJ's decision be affirmed. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
The facts are set forth in detail in the ALJ's decision.1 -For the purposes of our 
decision, we will confine our review to the salient facts relevant to Paganini's 
exceptions. 
Paganini is-presently employed by the City as a bus driver. He was a CSEA 
shop steward for four years. In May 2001, he unsuccessfully ran for unit president. 
In his amended improper practice charge, Paganini alleged that he had been 
involved in a very close election campaign for unit president and-Jie lost by 17 votes. 
He alleged that he exposed certain "wrong doings" and, as a result of his efforts to 
inform the members, the incumbent president retaliated against him by removing him 
1
 35 PERB 1(4594 (2002). 
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from his position as shop steward. Paganini filed acomplaint with CSEA's judicial 
system, and relayed the details of his dispute with CSEA to a newspaper. 
In December 2001, Paganini made a request for four days of personal leave. His 
request went to Eugene Cammarato, Special Assistant to the City Manager. The four 
personal days plus the contractual holiday leave would have given Paganini seven 
consecutive days off from work. 
On December 18, 2001, Cammarato denied the request because, as Paganini 
testified, Cammarato never grants more than two personal days. Paganini thereafter 
used compensatory time for the additional two days and complained to his union 
representative about the denial of personal leave. Paganini met with Colleen Gallagher-
Dodge, executive vice-president of the unit, and they discussed the practice in his 
department. Gallagher-Dodge then spoke with Cammarato about Paganini's complaint. 
Cammarato explained to her that he had denied Paganini's request because, if he had 
allowed Paganini to take four consecutive days together with the holiday, it would be 
"like a vacation". The City had a vacation procedure in place based upon seniority and 
it limited the number of bus drivers on vacation at the same time. 
Gallagher-Dodge contacted the unit president and the CSEA Jabor relations 
specialist concerning the dispute as well as the CSEA president of the region. She 
advised the region president that she had arranged with Paganini to prepare a 
grievance and requested that someone from labor relations contact her. 
On December 28, 2001, Gallagher-Dodge sent a proposed copy of the grievance 
to the CSEA labor relations specialist with a request to contact her. She then reviewed 
Paganini's payroll records that revealed that he had no past history of taking more than 
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two consecutive personal days, despite his claims that he had done so in the past. She 
felt that the grievance lacked merit and asked for assistance from the labor relations 
specialist. 
Paganini met with the unit president, labor relations specialist and Gallagher-
Dodge at which time they advised him that his payroll records did not support his claim 
about using more than two consecutive personal days in the past. However, Paganini 
remained adamant that there was such a practice. The CSEA labor relations specialist 
determined that Paganini's grievance lacked merit in the face of Gallagher-Dodge's 
investigation. Paganini, nevertheless, filed a grievance, which Cammarato denied. 
DISCUSSION 
Paganini argued in his exceptions that the ALJ erred in making his determination 
and he included evidence that was not before the ALJ in support of his claim. He 
contends that this newly-discovered evidence proves that CSEA failed in its duty of fair 
representation on his behalf. 
Part 213.2 of our Rules of Procedure (Rules) limits our review of the ALJ's 
determination to the record before him or her.2 Our review of the record indicates that 
the proposed document was not before the ALJ when he made his determination. 
Consequently, we are foreclosed from considering it upon this appeal. We, therefore, 
dismiss this part of the exceptions. 
2
 See Margolin v. Newman, 130 AD2d 312, 20 PERB fl7018 (3d Dep't 1987), appeal 
dismissed, 71 NY2d 844, 21 PERB 117005 (1988). 
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We must consider Paganini's remaining exceptions in light of Civil Service 
Employees Association, Inc. v. PERB and Diaz? The standard by which to prove a 
violation of the duty of fair representation was judicially determined in Diaz and requires 
that: 
In order to establish a claim for breach of the duty of fair 
representation against a union, there must be a showing that the 
activity, or lack thereof, which formed the basis of the charges 
against the union was deliberately invidious, arbitrary or founded in 
bad faith, (citations omitted) 
We have also held that a mere difference of opinion between an employee 
organization and an employee about the interpretation of a contractual provision or 
practice is not sufficient to establish a breach of the duty of fair representation in 
violation of §209-a.2(c) of the Act.4 
The record before the ALJ clearly establishes that representatives of CSEA 
investigated Paganini's grievance. It was only after receipt of payroll data that CSEA 
determined that Paganini's claim was unsupported and that it would not prosecute 
Paganini's grievance. Upon this record, we conclude, as did the ALJ, that CSEA 
undertook a good faith review of Paganini's grievance. CSEA's decision not to 
prosecute his grievance was neither discriminatory, arbitrary nor made in bad faith but 
was, rather, based upon the relevant information that it had assembled and considered. 
Paganini takes exception to the manner in which Gallagher-Dodge conducted her 
investigation. The evidence adduced on this record does not support Paganini's 
3132 AD2d 430, 20 PERB 1R024, at 7039 (3d Dep't 1987), affirmed on other grounds, 
73 NY2d 796, 21 PERB 1J7017 (1988). 
4
 Amalgamated Transit Union, Div. 580, AFL-CIO and Central New York Reg. Transp. 
Auth., 32 PERB P053 (1999). 
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contention that CSEA did not use its best efforts to obtain evidence to verify the claimed 
past practice. 
"As we have often held, an employee organization has no duty to process every 
grievance or to take every grievance to arbitration";5 as long as it properly investigates a 
grievance and informs the grievant of its determination as to the merits of the grievance. 
Based upon the foregoing, we deny the exceptions and affirm the ALJ's 
determination. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge be, and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: January 23, 2003 
New York, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A.^bbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
5
 New York State Public Employees Fed'n, 29 PERB 1J3019, at 3045 (1996); New York 
City Transit Auth. and Chapter 2, Civil Service Technical Guild, Local 375, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO, 22 PERB 1T3028 (1989). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF ULSTER 
CASE NO. E-2267 
Upon the Application for Designation of Persons as 
Managerial or Confidential. 
ROEMER, WALLENS & MINEAUX, LLP (WILLIAM M. WALLENS of 
Counsel), for Employer 
MEYER, SUOZZI, ENGLISH & KLEIN, P.C. (RICHARD S. CORENTHAL of 
counsel), for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Laborers' International Union of 
North America, Local 17 (Local 17) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), 
pursuant to an application filed by the Town of Ulster (Town), designating Ann Mitchell, 
Municipal Bookkeeper, as confidential within the meaning of §201.7(a) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act).1 Mitchell's title is within the unit represented by 
Local 17. 
1
 Section 201.7(a) defines the term "public employee" as "any person holding a position 
by appointment or employment in the service of a public employer, except that such 
term shall not include for the purposes of any provision of this article other than sections 
two hundred ten and two hundred eleven of this art icle,... persons . . . who may 
reasonably be designated from time to time as managerial or confidential upon 
application of the public employer to the appropriate board. . . . Employees may be 
designated as managerial only if they are persons (i) who formulate policy or (ii) who 
may reasonably be required on behalf of the public employer to assist directly in the 
preparation for and conduct of collective negotiations or to have a major role in the 
administration of agreements or in personnel administration provided that such role is 
not of a routine or clerical nature and requires the exercise of independent judgment. 
Employees may be designated as confidential only if they are persons who assist and 
act in a confidential capacity to managerial employees described in clause (ii)." 
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EXCEPTIONS 
Local 17 alleges in its exceptions that the ALJ erred both on the facts and the 
law. The Town supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS, 
Mitchell has been the bookkeeper for the Town since 1970.2 Her title has been in 
the unit represented by Local 17 since 1997. Mitchell has sole access to the Town's 
financial records, which are kept on her computer. She is primarily responsible for 
compiling data for the Town's budget, utilizing documents prepared by the various 
department heads detailing their expenses and revenue for the coming year, including 
projected staffing increases or decreases. The data she collects is then discussed with 
the Town Supervisor. Fred Wadnola took office as Town Supervisor on January 1, 
2002. At the time of the application, he and Mitchell had not yet worked together on 
compiling a Town budget. 
Wadnola testified that Mitchell reports to him on a daily basis and that he expects 
that he would discuss the budget data with Mitchell, seeking her input as he constructed 
a proposed budget for the Town. Included in their discussions would be sources of 
revenue, projected staffing needs, and expenditures resulting from collective 
negotiations. The final budget document would then be prepared by Mitchell and 
submitted by Wadnola to the Town Board. 
Mitchell has also advised Wadnola when a department was over-spending and 
pointed out to him where there were funds that could be transferred to cover the 
2
 Mitchell has been designated as Confidential Bookkeeper to the Town Supervisor by 
the Town Board, pursuant to Town Law, §29, subd.15. 
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shortfall. During the last round of negotiations with Local 17, Mitchell was called upon by 
the then Town Supervisor to calculate the cost of a wage proposal prior to the proposal 
being made at the negotiations. 
DISCUSSION 
In Town ofDeWitt (hereafter, DeWitt),3 we explained the two-prong test for 
designation _of_an_employae_asjconfidert^ ^ 
The definition of a confidential employee incorporates a two-
part test for designation. The person to be designated must 
assist a §201.7(a)(ii) manager in the delivery of the duties 
described in that subdivision, (footnote omitted) Assistance 
alone, however, is not enough to support a designation. In 
addition, the person assisting the §201.7(a)(ii) manager must 
be one acting in a confidential capacity to that manager. The 
first part of the test is duty oriented, while the second is 
relationship oriented. 
The parties do not dispute that Wadnola, as Town Supervisor, is a managerial 
employee, who has a major role in contract and personnel administration and in 
collective negotiations.4 Mitchell reports to him and, as Municipal Bookkeeper, has 
access to, and is responsible for, all of the Town's financial records and accounts. From 
those records, Mitchell could accurately project how much money the Town has, or will 
have, available for negotiations and other related matters, such as staffing levels and 
overtime.5 An employee is confidential who is privy to information about possible 
3
 32 PERB P 0 0 1 , at 3002 (1999). 
4
 See, Opinion of Counsel, 30 PERB1J5001 (1997). 
5See, Town of Stony Point, 18 PERB ^3011 (1985), aff'g 17 PERB 1J4070 (1984). 
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reductions in personnel, transfers and layoffs, which have a considerable impact on 
labor relations.6 
Mitchell has also, as evidenced on this record, been exposed to the Town's 
negotiations proposals before they are relayed to Local 17. Exposure to a public 
employer's negotiation proposals, before they are exchanged with an employee 
organization, is also sufficient to warrant a confidential designation.7 
We find, as did the ALJ, that Mitchell serves in a confidential capacity to Wadnola 
sufficient to meet the standard for designation set forth in DeWitt.8 As the Confidential 
Bookkeeper to the Town Supervisor, Mitchell reports to Wadnola daily on budget and 
contract and personnel administration matters and is relied upon by Wadnola for her 
input into the preparation of the Town's budget and negotiating proposals. 
Further, we find the fact that Mitchell, at the time of the hearing, had not yet 
assisted Wadnola in the preparation of a Town budget or in contract negotiations does 
not warrant a contrary conclusion. Mitchell's job description and the record testimony 
evidence that Mitchell has, in the past, performed the responsibilities described above 
and pointed to by Wadnola as duties he expects she will perform in her capacity as 
Municipal Bookkeeper. As we noted in Somers Central School District: "The correct 
understanding of §201.7(a)... is that an employee may be designated confidential if 
the confidential duties are already part of the employee's job description, even if 
South Colonie Cent. Sch. Dist, 28 PERB fl3022 (1995); City of White Plains, 14 PERB 
3052, aff'g, 14 PERB 1J4024 (1981). 
7
 Washingtonville Central Sch. Dist, 16 PERB 1J3017 (1983). 
Supra, note 3. In DeWitt, we noted that a confidential relationship could be inherent in 
the nature of a position or in the job description of a title sought to be designated. 
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confidential assignments have not yet been performed because there has not yet been 
any occasion . . . to have performed them."9 
Based on the foregoing, we deny Local 17's exceptions and affirm the decision of 
theALJ. 
We, therefore, grant the application and designate Ann Mitchell, Municipal 
„Bo_okke_ep_er,_asj:p_nfidential, 
DATED: January 23, 2003 
New York, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A: Abbott, Member 
»hn T. Mitchell, Member 
14 PERBU3058, at 3096 (1981). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ROCHESTER POLICE LOCUST CLUB, INC., 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-22824 
CITY OF ROCHESTER, 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on exceptions to a decision of an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) dismissing an improper practice charge, as amended, filed by the 
Rochester Police Locust Club, Inc. (Club), alleging, inter alia, that the City of Rochester 
(City) violated §§209-a.1(a), (d) and (e)1 of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act), when it unilaterally implemented a City-wide overtime detail as part of an "Anti-
Crime Initiative" and refused to negotiate the overtime criteria and/or the impact of such 
criteria and also denied the Club president the right to work the overtime detail. 
1
 As noted in the ALJ's decision, no facts or evidence are found in the record to support 
an (e) violation. The ALJ dismissed the (e) allegation and no exceptions were taken. 
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The City, in its answer, denied the material allegations of the charge and raised 
certain affirmative defenses. A hearing was conducted on January 9, and June 13, 
2002. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The Club filed a document purporting to contain 33 exceptions to the ALJ's 
decision.2 The Club argues that the ALJ erred on the law and the facts. 
The City filed its response in support of the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ, although, with respect to the §209-a.1 (a) 
allegation, we do so on other grounds. 
FACTS 
The facts are set forth in detail in the ALJ's decision.3 We will confine our 
analysis to the salient facts relevant to the Club's exceptions. 
On or about August 1, 2001, the Club president, Ronald G. Evangelista, was 
informed by the Chief of Police, Robert Duffy, that the City was about to embark on a 
new "Anti-Crime Initiative" which included the scheduling of voluntary overtime.4 
Lt. Charles Koerner, the commanding officer in charge of Special Operations, 
testified without contradiction that, with respect to non-special events overtime, such as 
2
 The Club did not appeal the ALJ's decision dismissing the §209-a.1 (d) allegation that 
the City refused to negotiate the impact of its decision to implement the Anti-Crime 
Initiative. 
3
 35 PERB 1J4601 (2002). 
4
 ALJ Exhibit #1. 
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the DWI or Seat-Belt Initiatives, the City in the past sought volunteers.5 Based upon the 
facts presented in support of the (d) allegation, the ALJ dismissed the charge. We 
concur with this determination. 
On August 3, 2001, Evangelista sent a letter demanding to negotiate "the 
method, manner and selection process" of the officers involved in the initiative.6 The 
Club sent subsequent correspondence, dated August 15, 2001, repeating the same 
demands.7 The Club's charge concluded that the City "unilaterally established overtime 
criteria and has refused to negotiate this issue with the Union." 
The City responded to the Club's demand to negotiate in a telephone call from 
the City's Manager of Labor Relations, Blaise Lamphier, to Evangelista. Lamphier left a 
message for Evangelista to return the call.8 Subsequently, on August 31, 2001, 
Lamphier, having received no response to the telephone call, wrote to Evangelista 
indicating his willingness to meet with him regarding the Club's demand to negotiate.9 
Lamphier testified that, on September 10, 2001 and prior to receipt of the improper 
practice charge from PERB on or about September 14, 2001, he met Evangelista on the 
street at which time he repeated the City's interest in discussing the issue. 
The Club amended its charge on February 13, 2002 to include a violation of 
§209-a.1 (a) of the Act. The amendment specifically referred to the details of the original 
5
 Transcript p. 80. 
6
 Charging Party Exhibit #2. 
7
 Charging Party Exhibit #4 and #5. 
8
 Transcript p. 113. 
9
 Respondent Exhibit 3. 
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charge and added the conclusory statement that "the City denied Evangelista the 
opportunity to work overtime."10 
On June 19, 2001, Evangelista wrote to Commander John Girvin and 
communicated the Club's position with respect to union officials working overtime who 
are on union release time. It was the Club's position that those officials may not be 
discriminated against simply because of their union affiliation. Evangelista concluded 
the letter by stating: "[l]f the City's position is different than the union's, please respond 
accordingly so that we can bring this matter to the contract administrator for a final 
determination."11 On August 15, 2001, Girvin replied to Evangelista's letter and set forth 
the reasons why Evangelista would not be provided the opportunity to work overtime.12 
The Club did not bring this dispute to the contract administrator, but thereafter filed the 
instant improper practice charge on August 29, 2001. 
DISCUSSION 
Refusal to Negotiate 
This aspect of the charge before us alleges that the City violated §209-a.1 (d) of 
the Act by refusing to negotiate the implementation of overtime and the impact that the 
anti-crime initiative might have on unit members. 
The ALJ found that the decision by the City to implement such an initiative was 
not a mandatory subject of negotiations but was, rather, within the City's discretion to 
determine the method and means to deliver its services to the public. In addition, the 
1 0
 P h p r n i n n D g r t i ; C v h i h i t -tfQ \j\ IC I I y u l y i d l l_y i_/\i I I U I L TT\J. 
11
 Respondent Exhibit #9. 
12
 Respondent Exhibit #5. 
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ALJ found that it was the City's managerial prerogative to determine the use of its 
manpower in the delivery of services.13 We agree. 
We have determined, as the ALJ also found, that the procedures for assigning 
overtime to those who are eligible are mandatory subjects of negotiation.14 In order for 
the Club to succeed under the circumstances set forth in the charge, it would have to 
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that there has been a past practice 
regarding procedures for the assignment of overtime and that the City has unilaterally 
changed that practice.15 The Club failed to do so on this record. To the contrary, the 
City established that its actions were consistent with the established practice by which 
overtime has been made available, on a volunteer basis, for similar events.16 
As the decision to assign overtime is not mandatorily negotiable and the record 
evidences no change in the procedure for assigning such overtime, we dismiss the 
alleged violation of §209-a.1 (d). 
Discrimination Charge 
The Club argued in its amendment adding the discrimination charge that the 
charge flows from the facts alleged in its original charge. Thus, the ALJ's dismissal 
13
 Town ofCarmel PBA v. PERB et ai, 267 AD2d 858 (3d Dep't 1999), 31 PERB1J3006 
(1998); Churchville-Chili Cent. Sch. Dist, 17 PERB 1J3055 (1984). 
14
 City of Peekskill, supra. See also Village of Mamaroneck Police Benevolent Ass'n, 22 
PERB 1J3029 (1989). 
15
 City of Peekskill, supra. 
16
 Such events are referred to as "non-special" events and include both DWI and Seat 
Belt Initiatives. . 
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based upon the untimeliness of the addition of a new alleged subsection (a) violation 
was error. 
Section 204.1 (d) of the Rules authorizes an ALJ to permit a charging party to 
amend its charge before, during or after the conclusion of the hearing upon such terms 
consistent with due process. We have, therefore, accepted amendments to a charge 
where the respondent's actions alleged to be in violation of the Act, albeit of a different 
subsection, remain the same.17 
However, the amendment alleged a violation of §209-a.1 (a) of the Act and the 
original charge alleged a violation of §209-a.1(d) of the Act. Here, the Club merely pled 
in its amendment a conclusory allegation that the Club president was denied the right to 
work overtime. No additional facts which would link any conduct by the City to the Club 
president's exercise of his protected rights under the Act were alleged. Consequently, 
the improper motivation required for the finding of such a violation was not pled, nor was 
it established. As the amendment failed to allege facts which, if proven, would establish 
the alleged (a) violation, it should have been denied.18 
Based on the foregoing, we deny the Club's exceptions and affirm the decision of 
the ALJ; albeit on other grounds, as to the alleged (a) violation. 
17
 State of New York (DOT), 23 PERB 1J3005 (1990), conf'd, 174 AD2d 905, 24 PERB 
1J7014 (3d Dep't 1991). See also Village ofDepew, 25 PERB 1J3009 (1992), aff'g 24 
PERB 1J4560 (1991). 
18
 See Board of Ed. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of New York and United Fed'n of 
Teachers (Kresz), 34 PERB 1(3026 (2001); State of New York (DOCS), 27 PERB 1J3021 
(1994). 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: January 23, 2003 
New York, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
bbott, Member 
ohn T. Mitchell, Member 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Capital Region BOCES 
(BOCES) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on an improper practice 
charge filed by the Schenectady-Albany-Schoharie BOCES Faculty Association, 
NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO (Association) alleging that the BOCES had violated §209-a.1(d) 
of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally increased the 
workload for certain teachers employed by BOCES. The ALJ found that the assignment 
to teachers in BOCES' New Visions program1 of an English Language Arts 12 (ELA 12) 
1
 The program offers advanced courses in the areas of law and government, health, 
public communications, business and financial management, and human services to 
academically advanced high school students, who are college-bound. The program 
consists of classroom instruction offered at the BOCES and internships at a variety of 
businesses and institutions in the Capital Region. 
Board - U-22898 - 2 
class for 72 minutes per week resulted in an increase in the number of preparations per 
teacher and a concomitant increase in workload, in violation of the Act. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The BOCES argues in its exceptions that the ALJ erred on the facts and on the 
law. The Association supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we reverse the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
The facts are recited in detail in the ALJ's decision2 and are referred to here only 
as relevant to the exceptions before us. 
The workday for New Visions teachers is 8:00 a.m. to 1:45 p.m. Formal 
classroom instruction is provided from 8:00 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. in an integrated 
curriculum including English, Social Studies and two other courses relevant to the 
program area. Teachers have five preparations for each course: one for each of the 
academic areas taught and one for the internship portion of the program. The record 
evidences that the total preparation for each four-subject course and internship 
component is approximately five hours a day and that some preparation takes place 
during the school day, after classroom instruction, and some is required after the school 
day is finished. 
In September 2001, the four New Visions teachers were informed that they were 
to begin teaching ELA 12 at the BOCES Vo Tech center. While there was some 
discussion between BOCES administrators, the teachers and the Association's labor 
235 PERB 114579 (2002). 
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relations specialist at a meeting on September 14, 2001, about the manner in which the 
ELA 12 course would be offered, there was no negotiation over whether or not the New 
Visions teachers would be the instructors for the course. BOCES thereafter issued a 
memorandum setting forth the assignment and the activities related to the assignment, 
including the expectations of the course and the manner in which the New Visions 
teachers were to interact with the Vo Tech teachers in teaching the course. The ELA 12 
course was to be taught once a week for 72 minutes or in two periods of 36 minutes 
each. The record evidences that teaching the ELA 12 course requires approximately 
two hours of preparation per week. 
The Association asserts that the addition of the 72 minutes of instructional time 
and the two hours of preparation time per week for the ELA 12 course has increased 
the workload of the New Visions teachers by virtue of the fact that they already perform 
significant preparation off-duty due to the nature of the integrated course they teach, 
coupled with supervision of the internship component of the program.3 
DISCUSSION 
It is not disputed that an employer may assign additional teaching duties to 
teachers during unassigned work time.4 What is at issue here is an alleged unilateral 
3
 The Association's amendment to the charge that the addition of the ELA 12 course 
has caused some New Visions teachers to lose their 30-minute duty-free lunch period at 
least once a week was dismissed by the ALJ for lack of proof. The Association has not 
excepted to the ALJ's decision dismissing this aspect of the amended charge and we, 
therefore, do not reach, it. 
4
 Greece Cent. Sch. Dist, 22 PERB ^3005, aff'd 22 PERB U 7017 (Sup. Ct. Albany 
County 1989); Savona Cent Sch. Dist, 20 PERB 1J3055 (1987J; East Ramapo Cent. 
Sch. Dist, 17 PERB 1T3001 (1984). 
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increase in workload occasioned by the addition of the ELA 12 teaching assignment and 
the preparation time required by that assignment. 
Where there has been no increase in workday or scheduled hours of work 
occasioned by the assignment of duties that are inherent to job title, the assignment of 
such duties is nonmandatory.5 While we have held, in certain circumstances, that an 
increase in workload could constitute a mandatory subject of negotiations,6 here, we 
find, unlike the ALJ, that the record does not clearly establish an increase in workload 
sufficient to bring the BOCES' decision to assign an additional class to the New Visions 
teachers within the scope of mandatory negotiations. 
BOCES properly exercised its management prerogative to assign additional 
teaching responsibilities to New Visions teachers during the workday. That workday 
includes time to be used for the preparation of lessons for both the ELA 12 course and 
the integrated courses taught by the New Visions teachers. That the integrated course 
and internship supervision necessitate preparation outside the scheduled workday that 
may have been increased by the teaching of, and preparation for, the ELA 12 class 
does not make the decision to assign the ELA 12 class mandatorily negotiable, nor 
does it establish an increase in workload that would require negotiations on workload. 
The amount of preparation time for each course is not set by the BOCES at a required 
amount of time per class taught, preparation for instruction or supervision of interns is 
still within the discretion of the teacher. 
5
 Greece Cent Sch. Dist, supra note 4. 
6Edgemont Union Free Sch. Dist. at Greenburgh, 21 PERB 1J3067 (1988); New 
Rochelle Housing Auth., 21 PERB 1J3054 (1988). 
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It is, however, possible that the decision of BOCES here to assign the ELA 12 
class to the New Visions teachers might have increased preparation time, might have 
reduced free time and might have affected any number of other mandatory subjects of 
negotiations. That is the precise rationale behind our decisions to require impact 
bargaining upon demand. 
A demand for impact bargaining permits negotiation about 
those mandatorily negotiable effects which are inevitably or 
necessarily caused by an employer's exercise of a 
managerial prerogative. As the concept has been developed 
and applied, impact bargaining is actually a limited exception 
to an employer's duty to negotiate all terms and conditions 
and to an employer's corollary bargaining duty to refrain from 
unilateral changes with respect to those mandatorily 
negotiable subjects.(footnote omitted) We have permitted an 
employer to exercise the managerial prerogative even 
though the exercise of that right causes changes to occur in 
terms and conditions of employment because we have been 
persuaded that an employer cannot be denied the right to 
exercise the managerial right while it bargains the 
mandatorily negotiable effects of the managerial decision. 
Impact bargaining, therefore, is an accommodation between 
at times conflicting rights which sacrifices, to an extent and 
of necessity, the union's right to bargain terms and 
conditions of employment. 
If the assignment by BOCES of the ELA 12 class to the New Visions teachers 
has necessarily and directly caused changes in workload or other terms and conditions 
of employment, BOCES would be exposed to an obligation to negotiate, upon demand 
of the Association, the impact of its decision. No impact demand has yet been made by 
the Association. 
Based on the foregoing, we grant BOCES' exceptions and we reverse the 
decision of the ALJ. 
7
 County of Nassau (Nassau County Police Dep't), 27 PERB1J3054, at 3120 (1994). 
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Inasmuch as the Association has failed to establish an increase in the workload 
of the New Visions teachers, the charge must be dismissed in its entirety. SO 
ORDERED. 
DATED: January 23, 2003 
New York, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Membe 
/ John T. Mitchell, Member 
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Charging Party 
RANDY J. RAY, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Dryden Central School District 
(District) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finding that the District 
violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
unilaterally subcontracted the exclusive work of employees in the unit represented by 
the Dryden Educational Support Personnel Association, NEA/NY, NEA (Association). 
The Association filed two charges. The first, U-22944, alleged, inter alia, that the 
Cafeteria Manager, David Bartholomew, who is not a member of the Association, in the 
latter part of July and early August 2001, made certain renovations to the Middle School 
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cafeteria. The renovations done by Bartholomew were alleged to be exclusive 
bargaining unit work. 
In U-22953, the second charge, the Association alleged, inter alia, that, during 
the month of August 2001, Archie Sutfin, a retired employee of the District, performed 
certain welding work which was exclusive bargaining unit work of the Association. 
,At_theL hearing, the District moved to dismiss the charges at the conclusion of the 
Association's direct case. The ALJ granted the District's motion as to U-22944 and 
reserved decision on U-22953. Each party filed a post-hearing brief. The ALJ 
thereafter found that the District had violated the Act by subcontracting the welding work 
that had previously been performed by unit employees. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The District excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that the ALJ erred on the law 
and the facts in finding a violation in U-22953. The Association supports the ALJ's 
decision. No exceptions have been taken to the ALJ's decision in U-22944; we, 
therefore, do not consider it. 
Based on our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we reverse the ALJ's decision. 
FACTS 
The facts found by the ALJ are set forth in his decision.1 We will confine our 
review of the facts as they relate to the District's exceptions. 
The Association presented two witnesses on its behalf. Billie Conger, the 
Association's president, testified that she met with the District's Business Manager in 
1
 35 PERB 1J4589 (2002). 
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June 2001. At that meeting, Conger inquired about work being done in the kitchen by 
Bartholomew. They had a subsequent meeting on August 16, 2001, to discuss the 
renovation work being done. 
Conger testified that: 
before school gets out, around May, there's a sheet that goes 
around to each office where, if you are a 10-month employee, you 
:._ ca nsig a u„p_fo_r: extra j/vork i n Jhejsum me_r._T_h.a_t J isUs_c_o_cnprised 
you put down what you'd be interested in, whether its cleaning, 
maintenance, clerical, whatever your interest would be . . . .2 
When asked to describe the listing for maintenance on the sign-up sheet, Conger 
replied that". . . [m]aintenance could do . . . they've done construction. I can't go any 
further than that, really."3 Conger identified Bartholomew and Sutfin as the two men 
involved in the kitchen renovation. Conger testified that Sutfin worked in maintenance 
until he retired in 2000.4 During the kitchen renovation (in 2001), Sutfin did some 
welding.5 
The Association's other witness, Sutfin, testified that he has been employed 
about thirteen years by the District. The majority of that time he was employed as a 
maintenance man.6 In that capacity, he had performed steel welding on a limited 
2
 Transcript, p. 21. 
3
 Transcript, p. 29. 
4
 Transcript, pp. 40-41. 
5 -r_.„_,—_:_,.. __. A A I i c i i i a o i i | j i , \j. 1 1 . 
6
 Transcript, p. 61. 
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basis.7 When asked how often he performed welding work, he replied "[w]hen I first 
went to work there I welded just about everyday for about the first three months 
because about every piece of equipment they had was broke down."8 Sutfin also 
testified that he was the only maintenance man capable of performing certain tasks 
because of his background. He was a retired U.S. Naval Officer and, while serving in 
ibe_Navy,Jiejwas an e n g ^ 
retirement from the District, he was contacted by Bartholomew, who was an old friend, 
to help out. Sutfin testified that he told Bartholomew that he would help him " . . . strictly 
. . . personal... no money or nothing."9 On cross-examination, Sutfin testified that at 
the time he left the District there was no one else capable of welding. Sutfin also 
testified that there was a lot of construction going on in the District involving outside 
contractors who performed welding. The outside welding involved work on capital 
projects, a nonunit supervisor "sweating" pipe and welding on alloys, for which the 
District did not possess the requisite equipment. 
At the close of the Association's direct case, the District made a motion to 
dismiss "on the grounds that the Association failed to state a prima facie case and 
violation of §209-a.1 (d)."10 The ALJ reserved decision on the motion as to U-22944 and 
denied the motion as to U-22953. The District then put on its case. 
7
 Transcript, p. 62. 
8
 Transcript, p. 62. 
9
 T r d n c o r i n t n R3 
10
 Transcript, p. 71. 
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DISCUSSION 
In Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority,^ we established the standard to be 
used in subcontracting cases in order to determine whether the transfer of unit work to a 
private contractor violated §209-a.1 (d) of the Act. We held that such a transfer was 
improper where work that had been exclusively performed by employees in the unit is 
subcontracted and the reassigned tasks are substantially similar to those previously 
performed, unless the qualifications for the job have changed significantly. Where the 
qualifications are found to have changed significantly, then a balancing test is invoked 
whereby the interests of the public employer and the unit employees, both individually 
and collectively, are weighed against each other. 
The District argues in its exceptions that the ALJ erred in finding that welding has 
been exclusive unit work and, thereby, the Association failed to establish one of the 
essential elements of its prima facie case. We agree. 
As we previously stated, in City of Rome?2 ". . . our analysis of exclusivity in 
cases where the unit work involves multiple tasks, multiple function jobs, or multiple 
locations, has come to rely upon the concept of a 'discernible boundary'." 
Consequently, in order to determine whether a discernible boundary has been 
11 I Q CDITDD i n n p o M n o c \ 
12
 32 PERB 1J3058, at 3140 (1999). 
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established around work deemed exclusive, we have looked at the nature, location and 
frequency of the work unit employees perform. 
At issue here is the performance of welding. The record establishes only that 
Sutfin did extensive welding at the beginning of his career with the District, some twelve 
years prior to the work which forms the basis of this charge. There is no record 
jevidence ofhis_p_eiforrning any^addrt 
performance of a task, for a limited period of time, more than ten years before the next 
performance of that same work, is insufficient frequency in the performance of the work 
to establish it as "exclusive" unit work. 
Further, based on the witnesses' testimony, the work of welding was limited to 
Sutfin, while he was a unit employee, and, thereafter, during his retirement. 
Consequently, on this record, to the extent that welding was performed "in^house", it 
was exclusively Sutfin's work and not the work of the unit. We are, therefore, unable to 
recognize exclusivity- to draw a discernible boundary around it - that is reasonably 
related to the duties of unit employees, especially now that Sutfin is no longer a unit 
employee.13 
The record lacks a coherent analysis of Sutfin's job duties during his employment 
with the District, and no job description was offered into evidence and Sutfin's testimony 
fails to identify the work performed that was intrinsic to his position as a maintenance 
man. Sutfin's testimony regarding the frequency of welding, for example, was limited to 
13
 See, Town ofBrookhaven, 27 PERB P063 (1994). 
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the first three months of his employment in the maintenance department.14 The record 
is, therefore, unclear regarding the exact frequency with which steel welding was 
performed by unit employees.15 Sutfin's testimony merely established that he was 
capable of performing many tasks because of his experience and training as an 
engineer while serving in the Navy. The District, therefore, enjoyed the benefits of 
employing an expertjn manyJrade_s_,_bjjjLthisjfo 
bargaining unit work. 
In fact, the record does indicate that welding was performed by other nonunit 
employees. If we disregard the welding performed in conjunction with a capital project, 
as the ALJ did, then we have two other instances. The first of those is when a nonunit 
supervisor "sweated" a pipe (the ALJ's opinion as to whether this constituted welding is 
contrary to the witness' testimony and improper as without basis in the record) and, 
second, when welding was needed to be done on alloys (aluminum) other than steel. 
The fact that the District did not possess the equipment to do alloy welding, or that 
Sutfin was not trained, is irrelevant.16 There is no basis in this record to conclude that 
steel welding was "routine" or to draw a boundary around "steel" welding as the ALJ did 
- there is simply insufficient evidence to distinguish the welding performed by Sutfin 
from that performed by others. We, therefore, do not draw a discernible boundary 
14
 Transcript, p. 62. 
15
 City of Buffalo, 24 PERB P043 (1991); Otselic Valley Cent. Sch. Dist, 19 PERB 
1J3065(1986). 
16
 NYS ThruwayAuth., 33 PERB fl3017 (2000), confirmed sub nom., NYS Thruway 
Auth. v. Cuevas, 279 AD2d 851, 34 PERB 1T7003 (3d Dep't 2001). 
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around "steel" welding and cannot find it to be exclusive work of the bargaining unit. 
Hence, no violation of §209-a.1 (d) can be found. 
Based upon the foregoing, we grant the District's exceptions and reverse the 
ALJ's determination. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and it hereby is, 
jdismissed. 
DATED: January 23, 2003 
New York, New York 
h^uM^</\L^{~^--
ichael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
n T. Mitchell, Member 
'^ 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5247 
TOWN OF LOCKPORT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
) A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Certification - C-5247 - 2 -
Included: All full-time and part-time employees in the following titles: 
Court clerk, clerk (water), clerk (building and assessing), data 
processing control clerk, deputy town clerk/deputy registrar of vital 
statistics, deputy building inspector and deputy assessor. 
Excluded: Assessor, building inspector and all others. 
FURTHERJT IS ORDERED that Ihe above namedpublic empioyershaii 
negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: January 23, 2003 
New York, New York 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
DUTCHESS COUNTY BOCES SUPPORT STAFF 
ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5252 
DUTCHESS COUNTY BOCES, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Dutchess County BOCES Support Staff 
Association, has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and 
the settlement of grievances. 
Included: Account Clerk, Account Clerk/Typist, AV Repair Tech, Bus 
Driver/Maintenance Worker, Cook, Courier, Custodial Worker, 
Custodial Worker/Courier, Custodial Worker/Groundskeeper, Food 
Service Helper, Food Service Helper (Lead), Graphics Aide, Head 
Maintenance Mechanic, Instructional Systems Research Specialist 
Certification - C-5252 - 2 -
(Tech I), Instructional Tech Support Assistant, Instructional 
Technology Acquisition Specialist, Instructional Technology 
Systems Specialist (Tech II), Intake Worker, Job Coach, Jr. 
Accountant, Maint.-Coop. Plumber, Ma int.-Coo p. -Electrician II, 
Maint.-Coop./Carpenter, Maintenance Helper, Maintenance 
Worker, Microcomputer Technician, Personnel Assistant, Program 
Assistant, Receiving Clerk, Receptionist/Typist, Sr. Microcomputer 
Technician, Stenographer, Transportation Broker, Typist. 
Excluded: Job titles represented by the Dutchess County BOCES Faculty 
Association, the BOCES Administrative and Supervisory 
Association of Dutchess County, Dutchess County BOCES Adult 
Education Instructors' Association, the Instructional Systems 
Research Specialist (Supervisor) title currently held by Rudi 
Arcardi, EAP Counselor, titles deemed managerial and confidential 
under the Act, and all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Dutchess County BOCES Support Staff Association. The 
duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times 
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: January 23, 2003 
New York, New York 
/VLt'&tUuy } ?(Z£u. 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
... .M. // 
/ / / //(A iZA «" --<svi 
' Marc A. Abbott, Member 
Goran T. Mitchell, Member 
